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ALD-202        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1614 
____________ 
 
LEONARD A. PELULLO, 
    Appellant, 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 11-cv-06678 and 01-00124; D.C. Crim. No. 94-cr-00276-002) 
District Judge: Dickinson R. Debevoise 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 14, 2012 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: June 26, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Appellant Leonard Pelullo, a federal prisoner, is currently serving a sentence 
imposed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for 
embezzlement and money laundering.  We affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
sentence in United States v. Pelullo, 185 F.3d 863 (3d Cir. 1999) (table) (“Pelullo I”).  
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We described a decade of litigation since then in Pelullo v. United States, 352 Fed. Appx. 
620 (3d Cir. 2009), which the instant appeal does not require us to repeat. 
 On May 17, 2010, Pelullo moved for relief pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 60(b) 
and (d) on the ground that the Government misrepresented to us in a prior appeal, see 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005), that the Pension & Welfare 
Benefits Administration (“PWBA”) was not a part of the prosecution team.  The 
Government’s assertion was in support of its argument that it could not be held 
responsible for failure to disclose documents that the PWBA possessed that could 
otherwise be classified as Brady material, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
1
  This 
motion was supported by documents Pelullo had recently received pursuant to a request 
under the Freedom of Information Act.  
On July 22, 2011, the District Court disposed of Pelullo’s May 17, 2010 Rule 
60(b) and (d) motion by determining that it lacked jurisdiction because the motion was, in 
reality, an unauthorized second or successive section 2255 motion.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 2011 WL 3022534 (D.N.J. July 22, 2011).  The District Court transferred the 
matter to us for treatment as an application for leave to filed a second or successive 
section 2255 motion, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), resulting in an appeal docketed at C.A. No. 
11-3134.  Pelullo also appealed this decision, resulting in an appeal docketed at C.A. No. 
                                              
1
 In Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, we held that there was no suppression by the Government of 
the warehouse documents, see id. at 216, and that the PWBA as an entity was not part of 
the prosecution team and thus the prosecution team was not required to disclose 
documents possessed by PWBA officials, see id. at 216-19.  We thus found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the withheld documents were material and favorable to the 
defense and whether there was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have 
changed the result of the proceeding, see id. at 219. 
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11-3222.  The two appeals have been consolidated and are currently pending before us.  
Pelullo is represented by counsel in these appeals. 
 Rather than awaiting the outcome of the above-referenced appeals, on November 
4, 2011, Pelullo filed an item pro se in the district court titled “Motion for the Court to 
Exercise Its Supervisory Power to Dismiss the Indictment or Grant a New Trial and to 
Initiate Disbarment Proceedings Against the Prosecutors and Hold Those Prosecutors in 
Contempt for Violating Courts [sic] Orders.”  In this motion, Pelullo sought to vacate the 
District Court’s July 22, 2011 Order on the ground that two Assistant United States 
Attorneys knowingly filed false affidavits in the matter currently on appeal.  Pelullo 
argued that their conduct violated certain criminal statutes, and he also argued that their 
conduct and the conduct of one other prosecutor violated the New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Pelullo further asked to be released on bail.    
In an order entered on January 25, 2012, the District Court denied the motion for 
lack of jurisdiction and denied the bail application.  See United States v. Pelullo, 2012 
WL 243538, *5 (D.N.J. January 25, 2012).
2
  The District Court further held that, even if 
jurisdiction was not lacking, Pelullo’s claims would not justify relief.  See id. at *5-*12.  
In so holding, the District Court observed that it had the documents upon which Pelullo 
now relied when it issued its July, 2011 Order, see id. at *3, and that Pelullo’s argument 
concerned only a “handful” of alleged misstatements, see id. at *5. 
                                              
2
 We agree with the District Court that, to the extent Pelullo was seeking to collaterally 
attack his conviction and sentence, the motion is a second or successive section 2255 
motion.  Absent our prior authorization, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
it.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h).  
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 Pelullo appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk advised 
him that the appeal may warrant summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6.  The parties have filed responses which we have considered.  
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Our 
standard of review over questions of law is plenary.  See United States v. Washington, 
549 F.3d 905, 911 (3d Cir. 2008).  The District Court properly declined to exercise its 
supervisory or inherent power to award Pelullo a new trial or to dismiss the indictment.  
Pelullo may not invoke the court’s inherent or supervisory power merely because he 
cannot meet the gatekeeping requirements for a second or successive section 2255 
motion; otherwise, the gatekeeping requirements enacted by Congress would be 
meaningless.  See United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(procedural barriers erected by AEDPA are insufficient to enable petitioner to resort to 
coram nobis).  See also United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 55 & n.18 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(All Writs Act does not authorize federal courts to issue ad hoc writs whenever 
compliance with statutory procedures is inconvenient).  The Supreme Court held in 
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425–28 (1996), that federal courts lack “inherent 
supervisory power” to enter an untimely judgment of acquittal sua sponte when doing so 
is in clear contradiction of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), and we held in 
Washington, 549 F.3d at 914-17, that a federal district court lacks inherent power to 
vacate a criminal judgment procured through fraud.  It necessarily follows that the 
District Court properly declined to grant the relief Pelullo requested. 
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Although the District Court has inherent authority to discipline attorneys for 
unprofessional conduct, see In re: Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2003), Pelullo 
provided no basis for the District Court to do so here, because his claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentations by the staff of the U.S. Attorney’s Office is meritless for the reasons 
given in the court’s thoughtful opinion, Pelullo, 2012 WL 243538, *5-*12 (“Nothing 
provided by [Pelullo] suggests actual knowledge or deliberate fraud by the government 
that would justify either an ethics inquiry or some other form of extraordinary 
intervention by the Court.”).  Further, as explained by the District Court, bail pending 
disposition of habeas corpus review is available “only when the petitioner has raised 
substantial claims upon which he has a high probability of success or exceptional 
circumstances exist which make a grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy 
effective.”  Landano v. Rufferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir.1992).  Pelullo did not 
make this showing and thus bail was not warranted. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Pelullo’s “Motion for the Court to Exercise Its Supervisory Power to Dismiss the 
Indictment or Grant a New Trial, etc.” as meritless and for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
